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Abstract—As researchers, we already understand how to make
testing more effective and efficient at finding bugs. However, as
fuzzing (i.e., automated testing) becomes more widely adopted
in practice, practitioners are asking: Which assurances does a
fuzzing campaign provide that exposes no bugs? When is it safe
to stop the fuzzer with a reasonable residual risk? How much
longer should the fuzzer be run to achieve sufficient coverage?
It is time for us to move beyond the innovation of increasingly
sophisticated testing techniques, to build a body of knowledge
around the explication and quantification of the testing process,
and to develop sound methodologies to estimate and extrapolate
these quantities with measurable accuracy. In our vision of the
future practitioners leverage a rich statistical toolset to assess
residual risk, to obtain statistical guarantees, and to analyze
the cost-benefit trade-off for ongoing fuzzing campaigns. We
propose a general framework as a first starting point to tackle this
fundamental challenge and discuss a large number of concrete
opportunities for future research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive psychology tells us that the unaided human mind is
vulnerable to many fallacies and illusions because of its reliance
on its memory for vivid anecdotes rather than systematic statistics.
— Prof. Steven Pinker (Dep. of Psychology at Harvard)
A. A Vivid Anecdote
Last year, we attended ameetingwith several representatives
of a large company that provides security assessment services
for governments and industries worldwide. In preparation for
thismeeting, we learned about their product portfolio and found
that their main product, a protocol-based blackbox fuzzer,1
can be used for security certification of medical devices (IEC
62443-4-2).2 While the fuzzer is part of a larger certification
process,3 it is primarily the fuzzer’s task to identify vulnera-
bilities that could be exploited remotely over the network.
Now, medical devices are safety-critical systems and un-
detected vulnerabilities can be life threatening. For instance,
Halperin et al. [2] describe several attacks on an implantable
cardioverter defibrillator to control when electrical shocks are
administered to the patient’s heart. Hence, subjecting medical
devices to rigorous cyber security assessment is a powerful
mitigator of cyber risks. This inspires trust in the certificate.
1We shall use the terms fuzzing and automated testing interchangeably.
2The assessment scheme for IEC 62443, the worldwide standard for security
of Industrial Control Systems, is operated by the ISA Security Compliance
Institute and offered within the Embedded Device Security Assurance (EDSA)
product which ascertains compliance with IEC 62443-4-2 [1].
3The ISASecure EDSA certification also requires that the organization
follows a robust, secure software development process and that the product
has properly implemented the security-related functional requirements.
A violation of this trust (e.g., if an attacker exploited an
undetected vulnerability in a medical device that is certified)
would be disastrous. Thus, the company’s reputation and
the certificate’s credibility depend, at least in part, on the
assurances which the fuzzer provides.
We walked into that meeting wondering about this question.
Which assurances are derived for the certificate from applying
the company’s fuzzer? To paraphrase Djikstra, fuzzing can be
used only to show the presence of vulnerabilities, not their
absence. How do they effectively assess the residual risk of a
fuzzing campaign that finds no vulnerabilities? How do they
arrive at the decision to stop the fuzzer and to proceed with
the certification? It turns out that the certification scheme does
not specify how much fuzzing is sufficient for certification.
Neither does it specify a concrete value for the allowable
residual risk that an undiscovered vulnerability still exists. In
practice, the decision is with the individual security researcher.
Even if a concrete threshold value was specified, there is no
statistical framework available that would allow the researcher
to quantify the residual risk for an ongoing campaign [3]–[5].
In the end, we were told, the decision is mostly based on
experience. Clearly, a long-running fuzzing campaign provides
much stronger assurances than a shorter one; meaning, the
residual risk decreases as the length of the campaign increases.
Hence, intuitively there is a particular point in time when it
is both economical and safe to abort a fuzzing campaign that
has found no vulnerabilities.
B. Call for Systematic Statistics
In this paper, we argue that we ought to do better than
relying on an individual’s experience. The security researcher
should be able to systematically assess and quantify the
inherent uncertainty. The certification authority should be
able to provide concrete guidance in the form of measurable
threshold values. This offers an opportunity for us as software
engineering researchers to develop a rich statistical toolset that
will enable software engineering practitioners to assess and
quantify the automated testing process.
Senior members of our community have previously called
for a general statistical framework. In 2000, Harrold [3]
established the “development of techniques and tools for use
in estimating, predicting, and performing testing” as a key
research objective for future software testing research. Seven
years later, Bertolino [4] corroborated that “we will need to
make the process of testing more effective, predictable and
effortless”. Yet today, Whalen [5] observes “there is no sound
basis to extrapolate from tested to untested cases”.4
4In the quotes, the emphasis in italic letters is mine.
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Over the last couple of years, fuzzing has become widely
adopted in practice, including by Google [6], Microsoft [7],
Adobe [8], Mozilla [9], and Facebook [10]. Argueably, we
already know how to control, bias, and optimize the fuzzing
process so as to make it more efficient [11], [12]. Search-
Based Software Testing (SBST) has become a mature field
of research [13]. Practitioners utilize a large collection of
extremely efficient fuzzing strategies.
Going forward, there needs to be a similarly rich body of
work that facilitates a deeper understanding how to quantify,
measure, and assess the fuzzing process so as to make it more
explicable. Only then, practitioners will be able to answer very
practical questions, such as
1) Residual risk. Supposing no vulnerability has been found after
generating n test inputs, what is the probability to generate a new
test input that does expose a vulnerability? More generally, how
much has been learned about the program’s behavior, and how
much more remains to be learned?
2) Cost-benefit Trade-off. Supposing no vulnerability has been
found after generating n test inputs, how does the residual risk
decrease if time is spent generating m more test inputs? More
generally, how much more could be learned about the program’s
behavior within an additional time budget?
3) Testability. How “difficult” is it for an arbitrary fuzzer to discover
vulnerabilities in the program? More generally, what is the
average amount of information that the program reveals about
its behaviors per generated test input?
4) Effectiveness. How effective is the fuzzer w.r.t. discovering
vulnerabilities? More generally, what is the asymptotic number
of (discrete) program behaviors that the fuzzer is able to expose?
So then, why have previous calls of eminent researchers for
extrapolation in software testing gone unheeded? To most of
us, it seems counter-intuitive that one can soundly extrapolate
from tested to untested program behaviors. Rushby (1992) [14]
explains by analogy: A physical system exhibits behavior that
is continuous, which allows engineers to test a few critical
points of a bridge to make predictions about the safety of the
whole bridge. In contrast, a software system exhibits behavior
that is discretized and discontinuous. Hence, “tests provide
information on only the state sequences actually examined;
without continuity there is little reason to suppose the behav-
ior of untested sequences will be close to tested ones, and
therefore little justification for extrapolating from tested cases
to untested ones“ [14]. However, in the last 16 years statistics
has made huge strides, providing statistical tools that make no
assumptions about continuity (here, of program behaviors).
Moreover, many of us with a formal methods background
are swayed by counter-examples. It is trivial to construct a
small program with an if-condition where the else-branch
is evaluated with an infinitesimal probability. How can one
ever expect to extrapolate in a sound manner? The answer
is two-pronged: (i) It is possible to make no assumptions
about the probability of some behavior to be observed or how
many behaviors there are. (ii) Empirically, the typical program
does not resemble such counter-examples. Indeed, an empirical
evaluation of the performance of several biostatistical estima-
tors for software testing showed tremendous promise [15].
II. A GENERAL STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
SOFTWARE TESTING: CHALLENGES AND OPORTUNITIES
Estimation and extrapolation are classical problems in statis-
tics. We can understand testing essentially as a sampling of
program behaviors. As more tests are executed, we learn
more about the program’s behaviors. Our confidence in the
program’s correctness increases. To quantify this confidence
(and generally the uncertainty about any concrete statements
made, given only limited data) is a fundamental building block
of statistics. Hence, it stands to reason to construct a general
statistical framework for software testing.
An interesting initial attempt in this direction is the STADS
framework [15]. Bo¨hme borrows several innovative biostatisti-
cal methodologies from ecology to answer those practitioners’
questions (on the left) about residual risk, cost-benefit, testabil-
ity, and effectiveness. The ecologic analogy is very powerful.
It addresses Rushby’s concerns [14] about discontinuity and
provides direct access to over thirty years of research in
ecological biostatistics. However, while STADS is an excellent
starting point, the author introduces only a limited number
of estimators and leaves many questions unanswered. Major
hurdles are still ahead of us, providing abundant opportunities
for future research.
It is also the purpose of this article to highlight these
peculiarities, to discuss concrete opportunities for future work,
and to elucidate the underlying assumptions, their impact on
the statistical guarantees, and how they can be addressed.
These are the construction sites on our path to a fundamental
understanding of the testing process.
A. Software Testing as Species Discovery
Ecology is concerned with species discovery. For instance,
to study the species diversity of arthropods in a tropical rain
forest, ecologists would first sample a large number of individ-
uals from that forest and determine their species. The species
in the sample are said to be discovered. Exhaustive sampling is
often prohibitive5 and the discovered species represent only a
proportion of all species. Hence, the fundamental challenge
is to extrapolate from the species observed in the sample.
Biostatisticians spent the last three decades [17] developing
a framework that addresses this extrapolation challenge in
ecology.
Bo¨hme’s [15] key observation was that testing is about
discovery, as well. For instance, let us call each branch that
is covered by an input, a species of that input. To maximize
branch coverage, a fuzzer would first sample a large number
of test inputs from that program’s input space and determine
their species. The species in the sample are said to be
discovered. Again, exhaustive sampling is prohibitive and the
discovered species (here, the covered branches) represent only
a proportion of all species (here, all feasible branches). Again,
the fundamental challenge is to extrapolate from the species
observed in the sample of generated test inputs.
5For instance, it took 102 ecology researchers 66 person-years to sample
129,494 arthropod individuals representing 6144 species from 0.48 ha of
tropical rain forest [16].
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The species for an input can be defined in several ways,
depending on the dynamic program properties of interest.
We could say a new species is discovered when the fuzzer
generates an input that
• exercises a statement, branch, path, or any other program
element not previously exercised (code coverage),
• kills a mutant not previously killed (mutation-adequacy),
• exposes a previously unexposed assertion violation, pro-
gram crash, memory error, non-functional error, race
condition, etc. (bug finding),
• discovers a previously undiscovered sensitive information
flow [18],
• or any other discrete property of the program’s behavior,
• or any combination of the above.
Within the ecologic analogy, a test input is the individual
or sampling unit, and the observed program behavior is the
input’s species. An input can belong to multiple species.
For instance, each statement that an input executes may be
considered a species of that input. A fuzzer samples test inputs
and discovers species. A dynamic analysis identifies an input’s
species. For instance, the gcc tool identifies the statements
exercised by an input.
The perspective of Software Testing and Analysis as Discov-
ery of Species (STADS) provides direct access to 30+ years of
research in ecological biostatistics [17]. In the following, we
present examples of biostatistical estimators and their utility
in automated testing.6
Residual risk can be assessed using the probability to
discover a new species.7 The discovery probability is the prob-
ability that the next generated test input leads to the discovery
of a previously unseen species. The discovery probability
U(n) can be estimated accurately and efficiently for arbitrary
species abundance distributions [19]–[22] using Good-Turing
[23]
Uˆ(n) =
f1
n
(1)
where f1 is the number of (singleton) species having been
observed exactly once in the campaign.8 Now, a test input can
belong to some species and not expose an error, or belong
to the same species and expose an error. For the purpose of
discussion let the latter be a species on its own. If no error
has been exposed throughout the campaign, the Good-Turing
estimator gives an upper bound on the probability to generate
a test input that exposes an error.
6Due to the lack of space, the reader is referred to Bo¨hme [15] for a formal
introduction of the STADS framework and the statistical models underpinning
the framework.
7In ecology, discovery probability is called sample coverage and gives the
proportion of individuals in the population belonging to a species represented
in the sample.
8Intuitively, even after n test inputs have been generated there are still f1
species that have been observed exactly once; clearly, we can expect it takes
at least as many test inputs to observe one of f0 undiscovered species that
have not been observed, at all.
Cost-benefit trade-offs can be assessed using statistical
extrapolation. Given S(n) species have been discovered after
n test inputs have been generated, we can estimate the number
of species S(n+m∗)—that we can expect to discover if m∗
more test inputs are generated—using the following estimator
[17], [24]
Sˆ(n+m∗) = S(n) + fˆ0
[
1−
(
1−
f1
nfˆ0 + f1
)
m
∗
]
(2)
where f1 is the number of (singleton) species having been
observed exactly once in the campaign, and fˆ0 = Sˆ − S(n)
is an estimate of the number of (undiscovered) species. If
unknown, the asymptotic total number of species S can be
estimated as follows [25], [26]
Sˆ =
{
S(n) + f21 /(2f2) if f2 > 0
S(n) + f1(f1 − 1)/2 otherwise
(3)
where f2 is the number of (doubleton) species that have
been observed exactly twice throughout the campaign. Given
a discovery probability U(n) after n test inputs have been
generated, we can extrapolate the residual risk—in the case
that m∗ more test inputs were generated—as follows [17],
[27]
Uˆ(n+m∗) =
f1
n
(
nfˆ0
nfˆ0 + f1
)
m
∗
+1
(4)
Effectiveness. If the total number of species S is unknown,
it can be estimated as given in Equation (3). For instance, if
one species corresponds to one mutant in mutation testing,
then the Sˆ estimates the asymptotic number of mutants that
can be killed. Some mutants are stubborn while others cannot
be killed at all [28]. Gˆ(n) = S(n)/Sˆ gives an estimate of the
feasible mutation coverage.
Generality. The STADS framework [15] is general in the
sense that it does not depend on a specific programming
language, or execution environment, testing objective, or test
generation technique. For instance, STADS facilitates the
extrapolation of statement coverage, mutation adequacy, or the
number of bugs exposed for Java, C, and Python programs on
Linux, Windows, and MacOS using CSmith [29], Randoop
[30], or AFL [31]–[34].
B. Flaky Tests and Non-Deterministic or Stateful Programs
A test is flaky if executing it twice on the same program
may yield different outcomes. A flaky test may pass nine out
of ten times but then fail for no obvious reason. Such a failure
may or may not be spurious. Recently, Harman and O’Hearn
[10], reflecting on their experience at Facebook, established the
presence of flaky tests as a key challenge in software testing
research. In fact, researchers should assume that All Tests Are
Flaky (ATAF). Statistics is well-equipped to deal with Harman
and O’Hearn’s ATAF-istic world.
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We say that a test is flaky due to non-determinism if the
probability of a certain outcome does not change substantially
during testing. More specifically, the random outcomes of a
flaky test should originate from the same probability distri-
butions, and be mutually independent. In statistics, this is
called an independent and identically distributed (IID) random
variable. Examples are concurrent programs where a particular
thread schedule determines the test outcome, or probabilistic
programs where the specified branching probabilities deter-
mine the test outcome.
We say that a test is flaky due to statefulness if the outcomes
are not IID. The outcomes of a flaky test are either mutually
dependent (i.e., induce state changes) or come from different
distributions (e.g., due to externally induced state changes).
Regardless, there is some underlying state in the program or
in its environment that changes in-between test executions.
Examples are interactive programs with user-interfaces, such
as Android apps or web apps. Executing the same event
sequence twice may produce different outputs. For instance,
entering a sequence on a calculator program once (’1+1’) or
twice (’1+11+1’) will give different results.
Statistics provides a large set of methodologies for estima-
tion and extrapolation in the presence of tests that are flaky
due to non-determinism. In applied statistics, it is a common
(though often an unrealistic) assumption that a random variable
is IID as it drastically simplifies the underlying statistical
theory. To determine whether a flaky test is due to non-
determinism (i.e., whether its outcomes are IID), we suggest
the turning point test. Existing statistical methodologies should
be identified and studied empirically. For instance, to study the
performance of an extrapolation methodology in the presence
of flaky tests, we can simply compare the predicted value to
the actual (future) value in several experiment repetitions.
In order to “unflake” tests that are flaky due to statefulness,
we suggest to execute each test case on the exact same state.
The advent of advanced virtualization and containerization
technology allows to capture, control, and restore the entire
state of the program and all of its environment, including the
entire operating system and the (virtual) machine it is running
upon. Clearly, this removes the need to handle tests that are
flaky due to statefulness within our statistical framework.
C. Extremely Rare and Rather Extreme Program Behaviors
In software testing, we are often most interested in program
behaviors that are both extreme and rarely observable, such as
a program crash or a missed deadline in a real-time system. In
applied statistics, rare event analysis [35] and extreme value
theory [36] have become substantial fields of research with
important applications, e.g., in economics, meteorology, actu-
arial science, physics, and ecology. For instance, Glasserman et
al. [37] propose an adaptive sampling method for the efficient
estimation of the probability of a rare event occuring. Software
engineering researches should study such highly innovative
sampling methods, tailored for the discovery of rare events,
to develop more efficient software testing techniques, or to
estimate and extrapolate the residual risk that a vulnerability
exists if none has been found.
In software testing, interesting behaviors can be clustered in
several very narrow regions of the program’s input space. For
instance, some file formats start with a “magic number” [38];
only if that magic number is correct will interesting program
behaviors be exercised. In ecology, a large number of endemic
species may be clustered on remote islands. To facilitate
estimation in the presence of endemic species, ecological bio-
statisticians leverage sample coverage-based estimators [39],
[40] or more generally Good-Turing theory [41]. In future,
existing biostatistical estimators should be evaluated empiri-
cally and specifically tailored to the context of software testing.
There are particularly well-suited adaptive cluster sampling
methods for efficient estimation in the presence of a large
number of very rare and endemic species [42], [43].
D. Uncertainty about Correctness and the Oracle Problem
The correctness of any statistical guarantee depends on
the soundness of the dynamic program analysis which distin-
guishes correct from incorrect program behavior for a given
input. More specifically, we cannot assume that all inputs that
expose a vulnerability are recognized as such [44]. Without
a vulnerability-specific dynamic analysis, the fuzzer is unable
to automatically recognize, e.g., a privilige escalation attack,
even if it is actually triggered by a crafted test input (i.e., an
exploit). In practice, the statistical guarantees hold only with
respect to the kinds of vulnerabilities that can be recognized
(e.g., a buffer overflow by ASAN [45]). It is interesting to note
that a similar challenge exists in software verification where a
program can be proven correct only modulo the specification.
Elbaum and Rosenblum [46] discuss the problem of un-
certainty in software testing. When Amazon recommends to
buy Sartre’s “Being and Nothingness”, Spotify recommends to
listen to Bach’s “Goldberg variations”, or the GPS is slightly
off by a few meteres, we can establish their correctness only
to some degree of accuracy and with some certainty. Statistics
is well-suited for assessing such uncertainties and inaccura-
cies. This allows to develop techniques that account for the
possibility that the oracle (rather than the program) could be
incorrect (i.e., cannot be defined with absolute accuracy).
E. Vulnerabilities Outside the Fuzzer’s Search Space
Not all detectable vulnerabilities in the program may be
within the fuzzer’s search space. More specifically, even if
all inputs that expose a vulnerability are recognized as such,
we cannot assume that the fuzzer can generate them. For
instance, suppose a vulnerability in an Android app is exposed
only via system-level events (e.g., a low battery-level); if the
fuzzer cannot generate system-level events, this vulnerability is
clearly out of scope for the fuzzer. As such, an estimate of the
residual risk quantifies how likely it is that this Android fuzzer
(or an attacker with a similarly powerful Android fuzzer)
generates an event sequence that exposes an undiscovered (but
discoverable) vulnerability.
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In practice, any statistical guarantees are correct only w.r.t.
the detectable vulnerabilities that are within the fuzzer’s search
space. In order to provide more general statistical guarantees,
we should investigate (i) a sound extrapolation from the
fuzzer’s search space to the entire input domain [47] and
(ii) a sound integration of several individual estimates—from
fuzzers which cover disjoint domains in the program’s input
space—into a single, global estimate.
Moreover, we argue that a fuzzer’s effectiveness is defined
by the asymptotic number of vulnerabilities the fuzzer is able
discover. We should leverage statistical methodologies [25] to
extrapolate from the number of vulnerabilities seen throughout
a (non-exhaustive) fuzzing campaign to the asympotic total
number of vulnerabilities, in order to derive a sound estimate
of fuzzer effectiveness. For a sound comparison of two different
fuzzers, we should study how to efficiently quantify the
overlap of their search spaces.
F. Challenges of Adaptive Bias in Automated Test Generation
Most search-based software testing (SBST) techniques in-
troduce an adaptive bias that needs to be corrected in the
statistical analysis. As discussed earlier, the statistical analysis
is substantially simplified if we can assume that the outcome
of every test the fuzzer generates is IID. This is assumption
indeed holds for all blackbox fuzzers that do not adapt based
on feedback from the program. However, this assumption
does not hold for SBST techniques, where the probability to
discover a vulnerability is supposed to increase with the length
of the fuzzing campaign. The fitness of previously generated
test inputs will adaptively drive the fitness (or quality) of test
inputs generated later in the fuzzing campaign.
In ecology, there exist several strategies to correct such
adaptive bias a postiori. Like in software testing, ecologists are
interested in boosting the efficiency of species discovery. For
instance, the adaptive bias in adaptive cluster sampling [48]
is corrected using the Horvitz-Thompson estimator [49]. For
search-based testing, similar bias correction strategies should
be developed and empirically evaluated. Unlike in ecology, we
can measure the adaptive bias during the campaign itself—by
comparing predictions to the actual values. This may allow us
to dynamically adjust for the bias.
An empirical investigation of the correlation of estimates
across various fuzzers for same-length campaigns would bring
insights about the estimates’ generality. The program’s source
code and program binary provide an additional source of in-
formation that can be used to improve estimator performance.
In future, the dependence of estimator bias and precision on
the discovery probability [23] can be investigated to develop
better bias-correction mechanisms.
III. CONCLUSION
Coming back to our earlier example: We can do better
than relying on an individual’s experience when assessing
the assurances of automated testing. The security assessor
can use Good-Turing [23] to estimate (as residual risk) the
probability that an attacker—with similar or less resources
and a fuzzer with similar or less efficiency—discovers a
vulnerability that the assessor did not discover. The assessor
can leverage extrapolation methodologies [17] to predict the
reduction of residual risk if there was time to generatem more
test inputs. The certification company can provide concrete
guidance by setting different threshold values for different
levels of allowed residual risk. The security certificate can
provide statistical guarantees and clearly state the conditions
under which they hold.
Yet, there are many challenges still ahead of us. Generality
of the assurances should be improved by developing statistical
methodologies for cases where the current assumptions do not
hold. Estimator performance should be improved by account-
ing for the peculiarities of software testing. Empirical studies
of the performance of various estimators should be conducted
for different programs, fuzzers, and oracles. This is our vision.
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